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Abstract
: Global tobacco control is a major public health issue, asBackground
smoking-related disease burden remains high worldwide. The World Bank and
the World Health Organization (WHO) are the driving forces in global tobacco
control. However, little research has focused on their development, financing,
decision-making, and accountability structures.
: We used two strategies to identify the development and structure ofMethods
global tobacco control initiatives. First, we reviewed the published literature
through electronic databases. Second, we conducted grey literature searching.
: We identified four periods in the Bank’s involvement in global tobaccoResults
control, from creation of the evidence base in the 1990s to the implementation
of tax reforms. We identified three phases in the WHO’s efforts, from its early
recognition of the link between tobacco and health risks in the 1970s to its
implementation of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Both
organisations are financed by a handful of private philanthropies, and face
similar risks for effective tobacco control: reduced accountability and resource
mobilisation, poor decision-making authority due to specific donor influence,
and difficulty in monitoring and evaluation.
 Continued attention should be paid not only to the primaryConclusions:
health-related outcomes of tobacco use, but also to the decision-making and
financing structures to promote tobacco control activities.
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Introduction
Tobacco use kills seven million people worldwide annually and 
tobacco-related disorders cause a substantial burden, account-
able for approximately 150 million disability-adjusted life years1,2. 
Since the 1990s, evidence-based measures to combat tobacco 
use have been identified and implemented3. At the global level, 
two international organisations, the World Bank and the World 
Health Organization (WHO), have become the most influential 
agencies in tobacco control. The Bank was the driving force in cre-
ating evidence on tobacco economics4, and used its longstanding 
relationships with finance ministries to implement tax reforms in 
low- and middle-income countries3. The WHO, the only norma-
tive agency in global health, used that evidence and negotiated 
toward the enactment of the Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control (FCTC). At the same time as tobacco control became a 
cornerstone of the global health agenda, the past two decades also 
gave rise to philanthropic agencies, notably the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation and Bloomberg Philanthropies. The Bank 
and WHO, given their resource limitations from governmental 
sources, have accepted this private support in pursuit of the tobacco 
control agenda.
The shift toward public-private partnerships for global tobacco 
control raises the risk of “Trojan multilateralism”5, in which 
a handful of actors play significant roles in the decision-mak-
ing processes of multilateral organisations. Safeguarding the 
Bank and WHO’s multilateral mandate and ability to make 
equitable decisions requires close attention to their govern-
ance6. Analysis of global health projects, therefore, should 
include a broader scope of work, from primary health outcomes 
(e.g., mortality or the disease burden) to financing, decision-
making, and monitoring structures7. However, researchers have 
provided limited insight into the development, current decision- 
making, and financing structures of global tobacco control 
projects by the Bank and WHO8,9. The particular focus of 
previous research has been on creating epidemiological datasets 
and analysing FCTC negotiations2,10.
In this paper, we review published and grey literature on the 
Bank and WHO’s tobacco control policies. We use this literature 
to comparatively examine the development, current decision- 
making, and financial structures of each institution. We then iden-
tify major opportunities and challenges facing these two institutions 
in tobacco control priority setting and effective resource 
allocation.
Methods
We used the following strategies to identify the development 
and structure of tobacco control established by the WHO and the 
Bank. First, we reviewed the published literature (Supplementary 
File 1). We primarily focused on the governance and financing 
structures of each organisation. Therefore, literature that 
focused on general cost-effective measures and epidemiologi-
cal studies were excluded. Second, we searched for research 
and project reports through the websites of the Bank (Projects 
and Operations database, Development Topics database, Docu-
ments and Reports database, digitalised archive holdings, 
annual trust funds reports, and Finances trust fund paid-in 
contributions database), WHO, Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), Gates Foundation, 
Bloomberg Philanthropies, International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
and Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME).
Results
Tobacco control and the World Bank
Evidence of tobacco’s danger first became available in 1950, 
with the publication of three research papers, which reported a 
correlation between tobacco consumption and lung cancer11. The 
initial evidence was followed by reports from the Royal College 
of Physicians of the United Kingdom (1962)12 and the United 
States Surgeon General (1964)13. This accumulated evidence also 
paved the way for the first international tobacco control event, the 
World Conference on Smoking and Health, in 1967. However, 
it took several decades for the Bank to initiate tobacco 
control projects worldwide. We identified four major periods in 
the Bank’s involvement in global tobacco control (Figure 1).
Phase I: The politicisation of tobacco control (1950s–1991). 
Starting in the 1950s, the Bank extensively supported tobacco 
farmers, as part of an effort to strengthen economies by 
increasing specific countries’ exports of expensive crops14. 
According to the Bank’s Projects & Operations database, the 
Bank committed USD 32 million in the 1970s to four projects 
aimed at enhancing tobacco production in Tanzania, Zambia, and 
Uganda15–18. However, in 1991, the Bank adopted an Operational 
Policy prohibiting it to “lend directly for, invest in, or guarantee 
investments or loans for tobacco production, processing, or 
marketing” (See World Bank Operations Manual).
This reversal of tobacco lending policies was largely due to 
the efforts of a handful of the Bank staff in the early 1990s. 
Howard Barnum, a then senior economist, played a key role 
in demonstrating the cost-effectiveness of tobacco control19. 
A tension existed between the humanitarian concept of health 
as a human right, particularly following the Alma Ata declara-
tion of 197820, and the Bank’s economically-driven, politicised 
development approach to health21. To prioritize investment 
in tobacco control for health purposes, therefore, the Bank 
needed to demonstrate its cost-effectiveness. Senior economist 
Howard Barnum advanced a particularly compelling argument 
that market efficiency could not be applied to tobacco because 
of its addictiveness and consumers’ lack of knowledge of its 
dangers19.
Phase II: Creation of the knowledge bank (1991–2005). The 
Bank then emerged as a “knowledge bank”, which could cre-
ate and marshal expertise on development topics22. In the early 
1990s, the Bank still saw tobacco as a health-versus-econom-
ics issue; the 1993 World Development Report argued for the 
importance of tobacco taxation, but simultaneously urged caution 
in applying tax reforms in countries that relied on tobacco 
exports23.
With the accumulation of evidence on tobacco’s dangers, the Bank 
began to make tobacco a political agenda in the mid-1990s. The 
1997 Health, Nutrition and Population (HNP) Strategy Paper 
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stated that tobacco control required a cost-effective approach, 
such as taxation or price measures. Based on this paper, 
researchers in the Bank’s HNP sector, led by Prabhat Jha, 
presented the idea of tobacco control to the HNP board in 
199824. They proposed potential control activities, including 
the production of an analytic report, construction of partner-
ships with other organisations, and the support for the WHO’s 
efforts. In this period, President James Wolfensohn also pro-
posed a Comprehensive Development Framework, in which 
he noted that development required a holistic approach; health 
was central to the development; and tobacco control was 
a key development agenda25.
There was opposition to this control agenda inside the Bank. 
Some argued that the policy was against the idea of trade liber-
alisation. One needs to note that the Uruguay Round was con-
cluded around this time, which enhanced trade liberalization and 
led to the establishment of the World Trade Organization. Thanks 
to Barnum’s efforts, however, the Bank had already adopted 
its 1991 operational policy, which forbade its investment in 
tobacco production. Despite struggling with this opposition, the 
Bank continued its effort to create the evidence for tobacco 
control. Such efforts were crystallised in the publication of 
two reports on the economics of tobacco-related deaths4 and 
its evidence-base in developing countries26.
This second phase was also characterised by a close collabo-
ration with the WHO. Gro Harlem Brundtland was elected as 
the WHO’s Director-General, and initiated the Tobacco Free 
Initiative in 1998. The WHO’s leadership enhanced inter-agency 
efforts in tobacco control, including the Bank’s tobacco 
control projects.
Phase III: Proliferation of new actors in tobacco control 
(2005–2013). The Bank provided the WHO with the evidence-
base on tobacco’s harm and the cost-effectiveness of tobacco con-
trol, which became a driving force toward the enactment of the 
FCTC in 2005. However, after its enactment, the Bank entered 
Figure 1. Timeline of key events in tobacco control by the World Bank and the World Health Organization (WHO). The World Bank’s 
tobacco control programmes can be captured in four phases, from its support to tobacco production in the 1950s to the implementation of 
tax reforms in the 2010s. The WHO recognised the tobacco’s harm early, and its efforts are divided into three phases.
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a slow phase in tobacco control. Some researchers speculate it 
was because of Bank bureaucracy; taxation and health were in 
different silos and the two policy groups could not collaborate 
with each other effectively on implementing tax reforms (See 
Devex article on The World Bank and Tobacco Taxes). Another 
possible explanation is the lack of leadership for tobacco 
control. Following President James D. Wolfensohn’s retirement 
in 2005, the new President Paul Wolfowitz (1995–1997), showed 
little interest in global health27.
In this phase, new actors started to work on tobacco control 
globally, including the Gates Foundation and Bloomberg 
Philanthropies. In 2006, the Bloomberg Philanthropies initiated 
the Bloomberg Initiative to Reduce the Tobacco Use in devel-
oping countries, based on the success in tobacco control in 
New York City. In 2008, this initiative went into the second phase, 
and was joined by the Gates Foundation (See Gates Foundation 
press release).
Phase IV: Global Tobacco Control Programme (2013–). The 
Bank launched multiple country-based tobacco control projects 
that were initiated around 2013 (Development Topic data-
base). In 2015, the Bank officially initiated the Global Tobacco 
Control Programme, which enhanced collaborations between 
the Bank’s HNP Global Practice and its Global Taxation Team. 
Such efforts were summarised in its major 2017 report, Tobacco 
Tax Reform: At the Crossroads of Health and Development 3.
The major driver for renewed efforts in tobacco control at the 
Bank was the election of President Jim Yong Kim and effective 
domestic resource mobilisation for health. President Kim intro-
duced a new model of Global Practices, and tobacco control 
was placed in the HNP Global Practice, which fostered interac-
tions between technical staff working in different regions. Also, 
in order to implement tax reforms in target countries, the Bank 
needed to establish buy-ins from country experts and leaders. 
The Bank therefore began to collaborate closely on tax reforms 
with experts from the Ministries of Finance in these countries. 
The results from such collaborations have been published in 
multiple Bank country reports3.
The Global Tobacco Control Programme is financed through 
the Tobacco Control Programme Multi-Donor Trust Fund, 
supported by the Gates Foundation and the Bloomberg Philan-
thropies (Figure 2). Bloomberg Philanthropies and the Gates 
Foundation each committed USD 5 million to the three-year 
(December 2014 to 2017) fund. It is a bank-executed trust fund; 
this type of trust fund typically supports advisory services and 
the development of the Bank’s knowledge agenda28. Accord-
ing to the trust fund agreement, the supported projects have 
a narrow objective to assist selected countries in implement-
ing tobacco tax reforms29,30. These objectives are accom-
plished through four major tobacco control activities: 
providing ministries with policy advice and technical assist-
ance; establishing knowledge exchange systems; helping 
to build capacity and promote tobacco control as a priority; and 
coordinating the programme with appropriate partnership. The 
fund is governed by a Consultative Group, which is chaired by the 
Bank, and includes representatives of the donors, the Gates Foun-
dation and Bloomberg Philanthropies. This Consultative Group 
selects country programmes.
Figure 2. Governance structure of the World Bank’s tobacco control programme. The World Bank’s Global Tobacco Control Programme 
is funded by a trust fund, which is financed by the Gates Foundation and the Bloomberg Philanthropies. The World Bank has implemented tax 
reforms in target countries since 2013. The decision-making authority is named the Consultative Group, which is chaired by the World Bank 
and participated by the representatives of the two donors. Progress reports and financial information are available on a secure website for the 
two donors. Abbreviations: BMGF: Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Bloomberg: Bloomberg Philanthropies. Sources: 29, 30.
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Tobacco control and the WHO
The development of tobacco control frameworks at the Bank and 
WHO shared several features: both organisations faced inter-
nal objections, identified collaborations within the UN agencies 
as a key to success, and had strong leadership, from Wolfen-
son and Brundtland, respectively. In contrast to the Bank, 
however, the WHO recognised the scientific evidence early 
on, and subsequently initiated its control efforts in the 1970s. 
(Figure 1)
Phase I: Tobacco control as a primary healthcare issue 
(1970–1993). In 1970, the WHO adopted its first tobacco resolu-
tion, which urged the Director-General to consider establishing 
an expert group on tobacco control. The resolution also high-
lighted the importance of educating younger generations on tobac-
co’s harm31. Such efforts were advanced through two landmark 
reports: Smoking and Its Effects on Health in 1975, and Control-
ling the Smoking Epidemic in 1979. The 1979 report called for 
action32, based on which the first permanent programme “Tobacco 
or Health” was created in 198033. Although it started small, this 
programme contributed to the preparation of technical reports34 
and lead to the inception of the World No Tobacco Day35 
to raise awareness among member states. This period coin-
cided with the organisation’s programming goal “Health for 
All,” which aimed to secure the health of all people through 
primary healthcare. Director-General Halfdan Mahler integrated 
tobacco control in a primary healthcare agenda36.
Phase II: Toward enactment of the FCTC (1993–2005). In the 
1980s, some researchers expressed their support for an interna-
tional law to regulate the consumption of tobacco products37. How-
ever, it was in the 1990s when the WHO developed a realistic idea 
for a global tobacco control facility. The original idea, discussed 
by lawyers Ruth Roemer and Allyn Taylor in 1993, was to 
use the WHO’s constitutional authorities38. Despite oppo-
sition inside and outside of the WHO38, the World Health 
Assembly adopted a resolution in 1995 to develop an interna-
tional framework on tobacco control. After Brundtland’s election 
in 1998, the idea gained political support, and the Tobacco Free 
Initiative (TFI) was launched39.
Tobacco control was different from other health problems by 
nature, due to active industry lobbying. The WHO’s noteworthy 
strategy was to gain support from the entire UN system39. Brundt-
land requested that other organisations shift the leadership role 
in tobacco control to the WHO. The WHO became the coordina-
tor of the UN and Bretton Woods systems, leading to the crea-
tion of an ad hoc Inter-Agency Task Force in 1999. In that year’s 
World Health Assembly, member states agreed to start a formal 
negotiation toward the proposed framework40. Beyond paving the 
way to the FCTC in 2005, Brundtland’s move created a momen-
tum across the UN system. For example, in the Inter-Agency Task 
Force meeting, the UN linked tobacco to the eight Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs)41, which pushed tobacco control into a 
global development agenda42.
Phase III: Implementation of the FCTC (2005–). After the enact-
ment of the FCTC, the WHO implemented tobacco control projects 
globally. The FCTC serves as a negotiation entity for resource 
allocation and decision-making, whereas the TFI conducted techni-
cal support for national or regional tobacco control activities, with 
the support of Bloomberg Philanthropies.
The biannual Conference of the Parties (COP) is the FCTC’s deci-
sion-making entity. The COP is attended by the Parties (181 coun-
tries as of March 2018), and discusses its budget and programmes 
proposed by the Secretariat. The main sources of the funding 
(Figure 3a) are the Voluntary Assessed Contributions (VAC) 
(Figure 3b) by the Parties and extra-budgetary funds. Therefore, 
the FCTC is essentially financed by WHO trust funds: resources 
mobilised voluntarily from donors, and held apart from the core 
budget28. Sources of extra-budgetary funds include governmental 
Figure 3. Budget of the World Health Organization’s (WHO) 
FCTC. (a) Trends of voluntary assessed contributions (VAC) and 
extra-budgetary funding [USD], 2006–2019. The WHO’s FCTC is 
financed by the VAC and extra-budgetary funding. The FCTC was 
initially financed solely by the VAC, but now the extra-budgetary 
funding exceeds the VAC. (b) Voluntary assessed contributions 
(VAC) for years 2018–2019. The major contributor to the VAC 
includes Japan, China, Germany, France and United Kingdom. 
Abbreviations: COP = Conference of Parties; EU = European Union; 
UK = United Kingdom; VAC = Voluntary assessed contributions. 
Source: http://www.who.int/fctc/en/.
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and non-governmental institutions such as the European 
Union43 and the Gates Foundation44.
The TFI supports national and regional tobacco control pro-
grammes. With the financing and close collaboration of Bloomb-
erg Philanthropies, the WHO’s TFI works with countries as 
part of the Bloomberg Initiative to Reduce Tobacco Use. The 
exact amount of funding is not available on public websites, 
but the initiative has provided grants to implement tobacco 
control with a focus on high-burden countries. The WHO, how-
ever, does not play any role in the grant’s selection process 
(Figure 4) (See WHO page on TFI).
Challenges and opportunities of the World Bank and WHO
Financing, decision-making, and accountability of tobacco 
control. A comparative analysis of the tobacco control policies 
by the Bank and WHO illustrates similarities and differences in 
their financing, decision making, and accountability (Table 1). 
First, both institutions rely on a trust-fund-like model. The Bank’s 
projects are supported by a multi-donor trust fund by the Gates 
Foundation and Bloomberg Philanthropies. The WHO’s 
FCTC is implemented mostly by the VAC and extra-budgetary 
funding, which are all voluntary funding sources.
Second, in terms of decision-making processes, the FCTC is 
the only entity that is not influenced by private philanthrop-
ies. The FCTC holds biannual COPs, in which the Parties 
(sovereign states) have the voting power. In contrast, the WHO’s 
TFI is not involved in the selection process of country projects 
supported by Bloomberg Philanthropies’ tobacco control grants. 
Also, the Bank holds a Consultative Group, which includes 
the representatives from the Bank, the Gates Foundation, and 
Bloomberg Philanthropies.
Third, the Bank is accountable mainly to its two donors fund-
ing tobacco control, and detailed progress reports and financial 
disclosures are available only for these donors on its secure web-
sites29,30. The WHO, on the other hand, is accountable mostly 
to its Parties, but most of the documents from the COP are dis-
closed on its website. Such detailed financing data are not 
available for the WHO’s TFI.
Challenges and opportunities. What are the opportunities that 
the two organizations created for tobacco control? The FCTC 
provides an international platform for financial and legal sup-
port to tobacco control activities. Through the FCTC, Parties 
can negotiate and support global efforts, and civil societies 
can participate in the conferences as observers. The Bank has 
also created the evidence on tobacco control, and implemented 
tax reforms globally. Based on this evidence base, attention is 
now being paid to effective implementations of tobacco control 
measures. Finally, funding has increased for tobacco control 
globally, reaching from USD 7.9 million in 1990 to USD 99.8 
million in 2015 (Figure 5) (See Viz Hub page on financing 
global health). There is a growing diversity in channels of 
global financial assistance, such as nation states, philanthropies, 
and NGOs. Such coherence toward tobacco control was not 
observed in the early 1990s, when the amount of funding was 
limited and mostly channelled by the UN organisations.
Figure 4. Governance structure of the World Health Organization’s (WHO) tobacco control programme. The WHO functions as the 
secretariat of the FCTC and the TFI. The FCTC is funded by the voluntary assessed contributions and extra-budgetary funding, the former 
from the Parties of the FCTC. The WHO is accountable to the Parties, and documents are available on its public website. The TFI produces 
technical reports, but its country projects are implemented as the Bloomberg Initiative to Reduce Tobacco Use. The WHO is a part of this 
initiative, but has no authority in the selection of funded projects. Abbreviations: Bloomberg = Bloomberg Philanthropies; COP = Conference 
of Parties; FCTC = Framework Convention on Tobacco Control; NGO = Non-governmental organisations; TFI = Tobacco Free Initiative. 
Sources: http://www.who.int/fctc/en/, http://www.who.int/tobacco/about/partners/bloomberg/en/.
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Table 1. Origin and the current status of tobacco control by the World Bank and World Health Organization.
World Bank World Health Organization
Response to scientific 
evidence
1990s 1970s
Major success Identification of tobacco control as a market failure Mobilising solidarity toward the enactment of FCTC
Approach Economics driven Political, diplomatic
Current entity of 
implementation
Global Tobacco Control Programme (2015–) FCTC (2005-) 
Tobacco Free Initiative (TFI) (1998–)
Objectives To assist countries in designing tobacco tax 
reforms
To tackle causes of tobacco epidemic: trade 
liberalization, direct foreign investment, tobacco 
advertising, promotion and sponsorship, and illicit trade
Location of activities Low- and middle- income countries Parties (181 as of November 2017), but the TFI works 
particularly in high-burden countries
Major source of funding Trust fund model: Multi-donor trust fund financed 
by the Gates Foundation and Bloomberg 
Philanthropies
Trust fund model: voluntary assessed contribution by 
Parties, supplemented by extra-budgetary funding
Budget USD 6,906,000 in two years (2014–2015) USD 17,470,000 in two years (2014–2015)
Governance Consultative Group, with representation of the Bank 
(Chair) and representatives of donor agencies
FCTC: Conference of Parties (COP), held biannually, 
with the Parties and observer participation 
TFI: WHO is not involved in the selection process of the 
Bloomberg grants
Accountability Accountable to donors (detailed progress reports 
available in the secure website)
Accountable to the Parties (COP official document 
available on the public website)
Figure 5. Development assistance for health (DAH) for tobacco control by channel of assistance [million USD]. Abbreviations: Gates 
Foundation = Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation; NGO = Non-governmental organisations; UN = United Nations. Source: https://vizhub.
healthdata.org/fgh/ 
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However, such opportunities potentially pose challenges as well. 
As leaders in tobacco control, the two organisations should 
consider three issues: their institutional segmented nature, the 
proliferation of new actors, and monitoring and evaluation.
First, tobacco control will continue to be challenged by the 
segmented nature of global health institutions and government 
ministries as well as global regime complexity, i.e., conflict 
between trade and health law45. An initiative can easily be 
classified into one sector, to which other sectors pay little atten-
tion. Some argued that this occurred in the late 2000s to early 
2010s in the Bank, during which tobacco control was imple-
mented only by health experts, and did not collaborate 
effectively with fiscal policy groups to implement tax reforms 
globally (See Devex article on The World Bank and Tobacco 
Taxes). Such miscommunication across sectors could occur in 
national governments as well. The Bank has made enormous 
efforts to build national capacities in implementing tobacco 
taxation since 2013, but the existing bureaucracies across 
ministries should be scrutinised; implementation, monitor-
ing and evaluation of taxation measures require collaborations 
that go beyond the authority of finance and health ministries.
In addition, tobacco industries are undertaking a growing 
number of tobacco control litigations under trade law46. Tackling 
such litigations requires close collaboration between health 
and legal practitioners, which poses a particular challenge 
for the FCTC, since it cannot legally force the Parties to adhere 
to the provisions47.
Second, the proliferation of donors, such as the Gates Founda-
tion, is a double-edged sword. Tobacco control programmes 
are not the exception to the shift in global health governance, in 
which multiple actors – including nation states, philanthrop-
ies, NGOs, and industries – are involved in decision-making. 
The involvement of private philanthropies poses risks, such as 
the alignment of objectives of implementation bodies and their 
own, and the use of material incentives5. For example, in 2010 
the Gates Foundation terminated a tobacco control grant to a 
Canadian agency, the International Development Research Cen-
tre, because the leadership of the organisation also directed 
Canadian tobacco industries (see Gates Foundation press 
release). Also, the Bank’s efforts are currently implemented 
with a narrow mandate that matches the philanthropies’ objec-
tives: tax reforms in targeted countries. Similarly, the WHO’s 
TFI operates with a particular focus on high-burden countries 
without having any governmental authorities in the grant’s 
selection process. Such an approach possesses an inherent risk 
of “Trojan multilateralism”, the ability of a few agents (such 
as specific states or industry representatives) to have an undue 
influence on decision-making at multilateral organisations4.
Lastly, monitoring and evaluation have become increasingly dif-
ficult due to the trust funds’ inadequate transparency28. Track-
ing development assistance for health (DAH) allows researchers 
to analyse the trend of priorities set by donors and implement-
ing agencies, and the lack of a comprehensive database to track 
development assistance for trust funds has been a major concern. 
Although the Bank sometimes releases annual trust reports, 
they are not available for recent years, and its Trust Fund Direc-
tory is out of date. Furthermore, its World Bank Finances 
database’s trust funds datasets generally only include trust fund 
commitments after 2005, and were last updated in 2013–201428. 
Datasets available from other institutions such as the IHME, 
AidFlows (a collaboration between the Bank, OECD, and 
regional development banks), and the OECD also do not cap-
ture the entire picture of the trust funds. For example, our lit-
erature search identified at least seven trust funds for tobacco 
control projects that were channelled by the Bank (Table 2), 
but no databases systematically included all these activities. 
Table 2. Examples of trust fund for tobacco control channelled by the World Bank.
Year Donor Trustee and Trust fund ID Amount (USD) Source
2005 World Health Organization Global Tobacco Control Activities 
(TFM22664)
200,000 WB Finances, AidFlows
2005 World Health Organization Report on Economics of Tobacco Control 
(TFM23338)
308,000 WB Finances, AidFlows
2005 US Department of Health and 
Human Services
Stronger Tobacco Control within a 
Sound Economic and Social Framework 
(TFM24236)
529,000 WB Finances, AidFlows
2005 World Health Organization WHO Grant for Protecting Youth from 
Tobacco in 5 countries (TFM24334)
183,985 WB Finances, AidFlows
2015 Swiss Agency for 
Development and 
Cooperation
Reducing Health Risk Factors in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina
1,100,000 AidFlows
2014–17 Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation
Tobacco Control Program Multi-Donor Trust 
Fund (TF072332)
5,000,000 Official trust fund 
documents, AidFlows
2014–17 Bloomberg Philanthropies Tobacco Control Program Multi-Donor Trust 
Fund (TF072332)
5,000,000 Official trust fund 
documents
The World Bank Finance’s dataset on paid-in contributions to trust funds includes a disproportionate number of trust funds in 2005. 2005 is the first year 
included in the dataset, and many of these trust funds may therefore be mislabelled as 2005 commitments. The WHO Grant for Protecting Youth from 
Tobacco in 5 Countries, for example, is more likely to be from 2001. Sources: 29, 30, 48, https://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/m54j-ersw.
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Moreover, while the IHME and AidFlows allow research-
ers to specifically search for Gates Foundation commitments, 
Bloomberg Philanthropies’ contributions were either unavailable 
(AidFlows) or included in NGO totals (IHME). Given that the 
Bloomberg Philanthropies has invested approximately USD 
1 billion in tobacco control (see Bloomberg page on tobacco 
control), this is a concerning trend. The health financing land-
scape for tobacco control may look significantly different, if such 
activities are properly reflected and private foundation commit-
ments are clearly identifiable.
Conclusions
Despite the small beginnings in the 1970s, the past two 
decades have seen the crystallisation of global efforts in 
tobacco control by the Bank and the WHO. This has resulted in 
major progress through the establishment of the FCTC and the 
implementation of evidence-based tobacco control policies with a 
particular focus on low- and middle-income countries.
The Bank and the WHO are the driving forces for tackling 
the global epidemic of tobacco smoking, given their norma-
tive functions, influence, and ability to catalyse collabora-
tions. Attention should be paid to the inherent risks of current 
governance structures: the segmented nature of institutions and 
ministries, concentration of funding from philanthropic insti-
tutions, and inadequate transparency on the trust fund fund-
ing flows and activities. Further research is necessary to identify 
each donor’s financial contributions to the Bank and the WHO. 
Independent, public monitoring processes of the WHO’s 
TFI and the Bank’s tobacco control efforts should also be 
considered.
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This article by Mukaigawara, Winters, Fernandes  and Sridhar is a welcome contribution to the existing
tobacco (control) literature, which has focused primarily on the health-related outcomes of tobacco use.
Given that, as the authors note, “smoking-related disease burden remains high worldwide”, continuous
attention for health related issues is of course of utmost importance. Yet there is also a need to better
understand the political economy of tobacco control and that is one of the key aims of this article by
Mukaigawara et al.
 
The author assess the role of the two international organizations (IOs) that have arguably played the most
important role in global tobacco control: the WHO and the World Bank. The authors provide an interesting
historical overview of their development, the way both IOs finance their tobacco control efforts, as well as
their governance- and accountability structures. The article shows how both organisations have been
instrumental in the development of the establishment of Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
(FCTC) and implementing evidence-based tobacco control policies across the globe. Yet, the authors
also point at some important weaknesses in the governance structures of the WHO and the World Bank
when it comes to their tobacco control efforts. One of the key weaknesses the authors highlight is that
both organisations rely heavily on funding from a very small number of private philanthropies. This is, as
the authors argue, a risk in terms of future resource mobilization, while it also raises questions about
accountability, and possible donor influence and lack of monitoring and evaluation of tobacco control
initiatives.
 
Although the article is indeed very insightful and well written, there are a few issues that the authors could
perhaps flesh out a bit more. This could be done either in a revised version of this article or in any future
work related to this theme.
 
The authors are right to suggest that what undermines effective tobacco control are issues like “the
segmented nature of global health institutions and government ministries,” as well “global regime
complexity” and litigation by tobacco firms, yet more could be said about this and how these issues are
related. What does the regime complex in tobacco control look like, why is it so problematic and there
ways to solve it? To this end, the authors could perhaps provide a slightly more in depth discussion on the
role of other IOs/regional (economic) organisations in tobacco control, as well as the role of national
governments (i.e. the members of these subnational organisations). The authors could also draw on
literature on regime complexity in other policy areas. Particularly interesting is the literature on the climate
change debate in this regard .
 
What is more, it would be interesting to say more about the exact implications of regime complexity for the
1
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What is more, it would be interesting to say more about the exact implications of regime complexity for the
political role and influence of tobacco companies. The key question is, as Alter and Meunier  put it,
whether and how international regime complexity impacts “decision-making and political strategies, as
well as empower some actors and interest groups.” That is, regime complexity provides internationally
operating firms with ample opportunities to engage in forum shopping and, as such, target those
institutions that are most favourably disposed towards their policy preferences. Research has shown that
tobacco companies use the WTO Dispute Settlement System  and Investor-State Dispute Settlement
Mechanisms within Bilateral Investment Treaties to challenge domestic tobacco control policies like the
introduction of plain packaging . Further research is needed on how business-government relations are
affected by the trans-nationalisation of tobacco firms and the institutional complexity of tobacco control
governance.
 
Finally and related, the authors briefly mention the tension between trade and health law and this issue
could be unpacked further as well. During the FCTC negotiations a compromise was reached whereby no
explicit reference was made to the relationship between tobacco control and international trade law. As a
result, doubts have been raised as to the likely outcomes of disputes involving a conflict between trade
and health concerns . In a recent ruling in a dispute concerning tobacco products within the WTO,
where several countries complained about the adoption of plain packaging (PP) requirements by
Australia, the WTO Panel ruled in favour of the defendant (Australia) and argued that the public health
measure taken (i.e. the introduction of plain packaging) was in fact not inconsistent with trade law (see: 
).https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds467_e.htm
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On current smoking patterns, about 1 billion smokers will be killed by their addiction in the 21  century, as
opposed to “only” 0.1 billion in the 20  century.  Reductions in premature deaths from tobacco
consumption are possible in every country, particularly with significant increases in tobacco excise
taxation .
 
Tobacco control involves ministries of finance, as well as vested interests in agriculture, commerce and
trade, it is unusual from most health challenges that are normally within the purview of health ministries.
Thus, understanding the global response to the tobacco epidemic is crucial, and given the multitude of
sectors, is complex. Devi Sridhar and her team have made an important contribution to understanding the
global architecture for tobacco control .  In this review, Mukaigawara and colleagues review the major
periods of global tobacco control that started first with attention by the World Health Organization (WHO)
and then the World Bank, and more recently by private philanthropies.
Their review is serious, scholarly and sobering.  It points to the obvious disconnect between the huge, and
largely avoidable burden from tobacco, and its response.  Tobacco taxation is, arguably, the single most
cost-effective intervention for health worldwide . Yet it continues to be vastly underused. Why? The
obvious reason is the enormous profitability for tobacco dealers, who earn approximately $50 billion of
profit every year from cigarette sales, or roughly about $10,000 per tobacco death  . The second reason,
articulated nicely in this review, is that the international architecture for tobacco control has been less than
optimal.  The alignment of financial and development interests with tobacco control demands a much
stronger role for the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as key counterparts to ministries of
Finance.
The World Bank made substantial progress during its phase when it produced the widely-influential
“Curbing the Epidemic” report ( ; full disclosure- I led that report, and organized its funding and
implementation while a Senior Health Specialist at the World Bank).  Since then, the track record has
st
th
1
2
3
1
4
Page 14 of 16
Wellcome Open Research 2018, 3:40 Last updated: 31 JUL 2018
 implementation while a Senior Health Specialist at the World Bank).  Since then, the track record has
been uneven.  However in the last three years, Patricio Marquez and team have substantially
reinvigorated the Bank’s response and produced an important report  that calls for a major scale of big,
fast tax increases so as to change future smoking behaviour.
WHO estimates that over the last few years, about 100 countries raised excise taxes, and that the
proportion of the world now covered by some form of tobacco control has increased substantially . This is
welcome news, but marked increases in adult cessation (which is the only practicable way to avoid much
of the tobacco deaths prior to 2050) would need large tax hikes paired with strategies to prevent
downward substitution.
What then for the future of global tobacco control?  First, as with most health successes, country
ownership is key to fund and to support tobacco control.  Here, the recent evidence that strongly links
tobacco excise increases to reductions in poverty (mostly from avoided treatment cost for
tobacco-attributable diseases;  ) is an important milestone that may increase country ownership. 
Second, the forthcoming Tax Force on Fiscal Policies for Health, chaired by Larry Summers and Michael
Bloomberg might provide important spur for governments to signals future price hike expectations to
smokers.  Indeed, France was able to halve consumption per adult in about 15 years versus the 30 years
it took to halve consumption in the United States by using large excise taxes and announcing these in
advance to the public .  Today French ex-smoking prevalence among middle age adults is well above the
European average.
Mukaigawara and colleagues warn, appropriately, about the undue reliance on private philanthropic
funding for tobacco control.  A small criticism of an otherwise fine paper is that they did not spend
sufficient time discussing research innovations for tobacco control (such as better and more local
epidemiological and economic research) or new tools (such as is now appearing with use of plain
packaging; ). Indeed, a useful trajectory of philanthropic research funding would be to move away from
implementation to a much deeper investment in creating new tools, and evidence-driven networks that
could support countries to raise taxes substantially.
Large tax hikes might well avoid about 200 million deaths over the next few decades  and are the only
practicable way to achieve the United Nations global goals of reducing deaths from chronic disease by
2030 .
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